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Synthesis, part of a Special Feature on Transitions, Resilience and Governance: Linking Technological,
Ecological and Political Systems
The Politics of Reflexive Governance: Challenges for Designing Adaptive
Management and Transition Management
Jan-Peter Voß 1 and Basil Bornemann 2
ABSTRACT. New concepts of governance take account of ambivalence, uncertainty, and distributed power
in societal change. They aim for reflexivity regarding the limits of prognostic knowledge and actual control
of complex processes of change. Adaptive management and transition management are two examples that
evolved from the analysis of social–ecological and sociotechnical systems, respectively. Both feature
strategies of collective experimentation and learning. In this paper, we ask how these two designs of reflexive
governance consider politics. Based on a framework of different dimensions and levels of politics, we show
that they are mainly concerned with problem solving by a focal process, but conflict and asymmetric power
relations, as well as the embedding of processes within broader political contexts, are neglected. We suggest
two routes for integrating politics into the design of reflexive governance: (1) recognize the politics of
learning for sustainable development and develop safeguards against domination and capture by powerful
actors, and (2) systematically consider the embedding of governance designs in political contexts and their
ongoing dynamics for political fit.
Key Words: adaptive management; embedding in political context; governance design; politics; reflexive
governance; societal learning; transition management
INTRODUCTION
The boundaries of what is considered the challenge
of environmental governance have been increasingly
expanding. Early approaches to environmental
governance focused on land development and
pollution and aimed at protecting nature and human
beings from disturbing interventions. Later, societal
production and consumption as well as technology
were recognized as part of the problem;
environmental governance was, thus, directed at
shaping society and technology in order to maintain
social–ecological systems. Most recently, the
patterns and processes of governance itself have
come to be identified as challenges in working
toward sustainable development because they
define the very capacities by which societies shape
and transform themselves.
This recent turn does not merely indicate a further
broadening of focus, but a shift in perspective. The
recognition of governance as part of the problem
structure eliminates the position of an external
supervisor and navigator of social change. There is
no longer an outside from where neutral diagnosis
and sovereign intervention can proceed. Governing
sustainable development thus becomes concerned
with its own conditions, the making of its own
knowledge, the developmental dynamics of its own
practices, and its (often) unintended consequences
(Rip 2006, Voß and Kemp 2006, Smith and Stirling
2007). This reflexive stance toward governance
abandons the assumption of “one” adequate
problem framing, “one” true prognosis of
consequences, and “one” best way to go that could
be identified in an objective manner from a neutral,
supervisory outlook on the (social–ecological)
system as a whole. Instead, it integrates a diversity
of perspectives, expectations, and strategies in a
complex understanding of societal change. It
embraces the understanding that societal change
results from a multiplicity of distributed efforts at
shaping it; and it searches for ways to retain the
multi-dimensionality of problems, the openness of
1Technische Universität Berlin, Innovation in Governance Research Group, 2Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, Center for the Study of Democracy
Ecology and Society 16(2): 9
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol16/iss2/art9/
futures, and the diversity of approaches in searching
for ways to cope with challenges of sustainable
development.
From different research traditions such as ecology
(Holling 1978, Armitage et al. 2007a), technology
and innovation studies (Kemp 1994, Elzen et al.
2004), and policy studies (Kenny and Meadowcroft
1999, Lafferty 2004, Voß et al. 2007), efforts have
been made to work out the implications of this shift
in perspective for the design of governance
arrangements. These discussions have yielded a
variety of new governance designs that feature some
common threads: although acknowledging a
fundamental ambivalence of goals, uncertainty of
knowledge, and distribution of power, they all
emphasize participation, experimentation, and
collective learning as key elements of governance.
As such, they have been grouped together under the
heading of reflexive governance (Voß et al. 2006).
Two specific designs of reflexive governance that
are the focus of this paper are adaptive management
(AM) and transition management (TM). Both terms,
although using “management” to invoke earlier
traditions of resource management and innovation
management, represent specific policy-oriented
discourses that focus on the conceptualization of
particular processes of social regulation. As such,
we describe them as designs for governance. From
within both discourses, explicit references to the
concept of reflexive governance have been made
(Szendzimir et al. 2006, Kemp and Loorbach 2006).
Recently, concerns have arisen about the political
implications of reflexive governance in general, and
TM and AM in particular (Shove and Walker 2007,
Armitage 2008, Kern and Smith 2008, Voß et al.
2009a, Smith and Stirling 2010). As empirical
research into the practice of participation,
experimentation, and collective learning has shown,
reflexive governance designs interact with real-
world political contexts that influence their
functioning and impair their effectiveness (Lee
1993, McLain and Lee 1996, Walters 1997, Conley
and Moote 2003, Hahn et al. 2006, Armitage et al.
2007b, Kemp et al. 2007b, Plummer and FitzGibbon
2007, Walters 2007, Allan and Stankey 2009, Kallis
et al. 2009). Furthermore, there are concerns about
the democratic legitimacy of reflexive governance
designs pertaining to issues such as unclear links
with institutions of representative democracy
(Hendriks and Grin 2007, Hendriks 2009b, Kallis
et al. 2009: 640), their potential to marginalize
particular interests and social groups (Lebel et al.
2006, Fennell et al. 2008, Shilling et al. 2009), their
implicit normativity (Shove and Walker 2007,
Scrase and Smith 2009), and their tendency to
stabilize and reproduce an incumbent (capitalist)
political economy (Nadasdy 2003, 2007).
With this paper, we would like to contribute
constructively to this critical discussion. We argue
that the critical concerns reflect some general
conceptual shortcomings of reflexive governance
designs. Although they focus on complexities of
social–ecological or social–technical systems and
their dynamics, both AM and TM tend to block out
the political dimension of these systems (Smith and
Stirling 2010) and, thus, do not adequately reflect
the implications of politics for participation,
experimentation, and collective learning. As others
have noted before us, however, it is necessary to
consider politics as a constitutive element of
reflexive governance and to reflect carefully how it
may play out in specific designs for participatory
experimentation and learning.
As a first step in this direction, we offer an analytical
framework that may help to create a clearer picture
of how reflexive governance designs are embedded
in and intertwined with politics. This framework can
be applied to systematically unveil the political
blind spots of reflexive governance designs and
detect ways of addressing these potential
shortcomings. It is meant to stimulate efforts for
making reflexive governance designs politically
more reflexive and the practice of reflexive
governance more effective and legitimate.
THE POLITICS OF REFLEXIVE
GOVERNANCE—AN ANALYTICAL
FRAMEWORK
Decades of political research have brought about
vast evidence about the manifold ways
environmental governance is embedded in,
entwined with, and shaped by politics. Here, we set
out to condense some of these insights into an
analytical framework that helps organize the
reflection on politics in the design of reflexive
governance. The framework is supposed to draw
attention to the pervasiveness of politics as often
unruly and hidden attempts at shaping the set-up,
process, and outcome of governance to further
beliefs and interests of particular actors. This shall
serve as an heuristic device for mapping different
forms of politics that are relevant when considering
designs for new forms of governance.
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Table 1. Relevant aspects of politics in different dimensions and layers (examples)
Dimensions
Levels Policy
(problems and solutions)
Polity
(rules and structure)
Politics
(interaction and process)
Micro
(focal interaction)
Problems and goals of a
specific governance process
Rules of procedure for a
specific governance process
Struggle for dominance
among participants of a
governance process
Meso
(policy domain)
Problem definitions and
policy approaches that are
dominant within a policy
domain
Institutional arrangements
within a policy domain
Struggle of organized political
actors for dominant positions
within a policy domain
Macro
(political system)
Discourse of fundamental
political values and beliefs
Constitutional rules and
political culture
Struggle for dominance
among broad social groups,
sectors, classes, or regions
We refer to politics in a broad sense as the processing
of a diversity ideas and interests with regard to
public affairs. Politics comprise interactions and
substantial accounts by which individual and
collective actors struggle for the definition and the
provision of the common good. It is through and
within politics that power is gained and maintained,
authority is assigned and executed, interests and
ideas are articulated, conflicts arise and play out,
collective action is organized, and public problems
are defined, processed, and solved. Politics are thus
constitutive for any form of governance.
For systematic inquiry into the politics of reflexive
governance, we analytically distinguish between
dimensions and levels of politics (Table 1). Whereas
dimensions refer to a well-established distinction
between different forms or “aggregate states” of
politics, the notion of levels captures a layered
structure of political contexts for any kind of focal
interaction process.
With regard to dimensions, we differentiate
between policy, polity, and politics proper (e.g., von
Prittwitz 1994).
1. The policy dimension refers to substantial
problems and solutions of politics. It includes
the definition of policy problems as well as
the formulation of reasoned proposals,
strategies, and instruments to realize policy
goals.
2. The polity dimension covers the structural
side of politics. It comprises institutions,
norms, and procedural settings, the “rules of
the game” for ongoing political processes.
3. The dimension of “politics” proper denotes
the actual process side of politics where
individual and collective actors with
diverging views and interests interact.
Controversy over problems, solutions, and
rules of the game and the struggle of actors
to get their particular view established as the
“common view” are relevant in this
dimension.
 With regard to levels, we distinguish among a focal
process of immediate interactions (micro), the
context of policy domains (meso), and the political
system at large (macro) (cf. Kiser and Ostrom 1982,
Rein and Schön 1993, Howlett 2009; compare also
with Geels (2002) for levels of sociotechnical
change). Above-mentioned dimensions of policy,
polity, and politics can be identified at each of these
levels.
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Fig. 1. Dimensions and layers of politics.
1. The micro level refers to a focal process of
political interactions with a particular rule set
(polity) that structures interactions among
participating individuals (politics) who deal
with specific problems and solutions (policy).
2. The meso level of politics includes patterns
on the level of policy domains where
comprehensive policy programs are negotiated
that frame whole issue areas. This takes place
in the context of issue-specific institutional
arrangements (polity) that structure conflict
and power struggle among organized
collectives with stakes in a particular issue
(politics).
3. The macro level captures broader patterns at
the level of political systems that span a
diversity of issue areas. It entails discourses
about fundamental values and forms of
political organization (policy), is structured
by constitutional rules and basic cultural
traditions (polity), and features political
struggle along broad social cleavages,
societal sectors, or classes (politics).
 Putting dimensions and layers together into one
framework, we gain a comprehensive schematic
image of the politics that need to be considered when
new forms of governance are designed (Fig. 1).
Coming back to the particular interest of this article,
we suggest using this framework to organize critical
inquiry into the politics of reflexive governance.
First, we can reconstruct governance designs such
as AM and TM with respect to their consideration
of politics and identify blind spots regarding the
political contexts in which they are embedded (next
section). Second, we can use the framework to
sketch directions for developing reflexive
governance designs that are politically more robust.
DESIGNS FOR REFLEXIVE
GOVERNANCE, AND HOW THEY
CONSIDER POLITICS
Adaptive Management
Adaptive management is an approach to resource
and ecosystem management that refers to
functionally defined social–ecological systems with
a regional scope, such as natural parks, river basins,
mountain ranges, etc. (Walters 1986). With
foundations in ecological systems theory and
evolutionary theory (Holling 1978), AM has been
postulated as a critical alternative to conventional
rationalistic concepts of ecosystem management
(Berkes et al. 2003a, Holling 2003). The literature
pertaining to AM is quite diverse. Aside from
theoretical contributions laying out the philosophical
fundamentals of AM (Norton 1999, 2005), there is
empirical research on the capabilities of governance
arrangements to adaptively manage resilience
(Berkes et al. 2003b; Lebel et al. 2006), as well as
on the emergence of AM practices in various
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contexts (Olsson et al. 2004, 2006). Finally, a more
prescriptive strand of literature that is at the focus
of this article deploys guidelines and tools for setting
up and implementing AM in practice (Sendzimir et
al. 2006, Allan et al. 2009, see also www.adaptivem
anagement.net/resources.php). Since it arose in the
1970s, the discourse has not yet yielded a singular
notion of AM. Instead, we can observe a further
conceptual differentiation as indicated by the
emergence of approaches such as adaptive co-
management (ACM) and adaptive governance (AG)
(Olsson et al. 2004, Brunner et al. 2005, Folke et al.
2005, 2009, Gunderson and Light 2006, Armitage
et al. 2007a, 2009, Folke 2007, Kofinas 2009).
 Assumptions, conceptualization, and operationalization
Adaptive management does not provide a blueprint
for resource management, but rather some general
ideas about social–ecological reality as well as
conceptual suggestions of how to manage this
reality. It rests on a set of distinct ontological
assumptions condensed in “panarchy” (Gunderson
and Holling 2002, Holling 2001), a general theory
about the dynamics of complex social–ecological
systems. According to panarchy, social–ecological
systems exhibit unpredictable behavior and
uncertainty that form the basic problem and “driving
assumption underlying AM” (Sendzimir et al. 2006:
132). Given these fundamental problem features,
classical approaches to resource management,
which are based on models of linear dynamics or
equilibrium and promote tight efforts to control,
appear to be inadequate and ineffective (Berkes et
al. 2003a). Following the proponents of AM,
management rather has to establish and maintain the
ability of social–ecological systems to adapt to
complex and unpredictable change. Therefore, AM
is conceptually concerned with learning, knowledge
integration, and experimentation (Gunderson and
Light 2006). First, AM is conceived of as an
ongoing, structured, and reflexive learning process
that allows for constant adaptation of the
management practice to deal with the uncertainty
of social–ecological development (Lee 1999,
Sendzimir et al. 2006). Second, addressing the
inherent complexity of these systems, AM puts
particular emphasis on integrating various kinds of
knowledge—scientific and professional as well as
alternative forms of local and indigenous
knowledge about social–ecological system behavior
as well as management practices—to come up with
a more comprehensive picture of the problems at
hand (Berkes et al. 2003a). Third, the emphasis on
learning and knowledge integration goes hand in
hand with a focus on experimentation. Experiments
are supposed to support knowledge acquisition and
learning in order to explore the system’s true
structure (Sendzimir et al. 2006: 140, see McLain
and Lee 1996). Moreover, policies themselves are
conceptualized as hypotheses to be tested and
constantly refined in practice (Berkes et al. 2003a),
rendering AM an ongoing experiment for
developing steering activities in which the policy
maker becomes a “nimble experimenter, with the
patience to consider long-term consequences”
(Sendzimir et al. 2006: 132).
From a prescriptive perspective, these conceptual
elements can be operationalized in terms of a
structured learning cycle that links four phases
integrating research, management, and practice
(Sendzimir et al. 2006: 141, for an overview of
descriptive process models; cf. Plummer 2009). The
first phase is about improving the understanding of
a given system by initiating discussion among the
participants of an AM forum. The goal is to generate
a balance of the known and the unknown that can
serve as a basis for policy formulation in phase 2.
As policies, from an AM perspective, are
fundamentally directed at “learning to adapt,” they
have to be designed in a flexible and reversible
manner. Whereas the making of policies,
accordingly, takes the form of designing and
refining hypotheses, the implementation (phase 3)
is conceived as a test of these hypotheses. Such a
scientific approach is supposed to give policies a
“disciplinary rigor of consistency in execution”
(Sendzimir et al. 2006: 142) and prevent them from
being changed during implementation. The fourth
phase of the AM cycle entails the monitoring and
evaluation of policy hypotheses in order to enable
learning processes that improve the rationality of
subsequent activities.
In sum, AM is based on an idea of learning by doing
(Berkes et al. 2003a: 9, Kato and Ahern 2008),
“learning by experimenting” (Lee 1999) or
“learning while managing” (Sendzimir et al. 2006:
140). It suggests a notion of management that
integrates science and local knowledge with
experimental practices (Olsson et al. 2004,
Gunderson and Light 2006) in an ongoing, recursive
learning cycle in order to adapt to the uncertainty
and surprise of complex, large-scale systems
(Sendzimir et al. 2006).
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How does the conceptual literature on AM refer to
politics and how can AM’s notion of politics be
contoured against the framework sketched out
above? A general observation is that the discussion
about AM does not make extensive use of a language
that reflects political phenomena. Politics is
certainly mentioned in early contributions (Lee
1993, 1999) and even more so in recent strands of
ACM and AG, which, emphasizing the social
dimension, show an expanded “political vocabulary”
that refers to the political context and political
success conditions of AM (Plummer 2009).
However, the reflection of politics does not seem to
be at the conceptual core of AM.
Nonetheless, politics does serve as an important
reference point for AM. Initially, AM was
articulated from a distinctly critical perspective on
existing regimes of resource politics: as an approach
directed at improving resource policy making by
overcoming its modernist fallacies and political
disruptions (see above). This shines through in
various theoretical, normative, methodological, and
practical features of AM.
On a theoretical level, AM conceives of the link
between management and ecological resource
systems in terms of a coevolutionary relationship
facilitated by feedback loops (Berkes et al. 2003a).
Concepts such as “feedback,” “coevolution,” “self-
organization,” and “resilience” suggest an ontology
of integrated social–ecological systems that evolve
quasi-automatically according to inner mechanisms
of mutual structuring, but detached from political
dynamics. Newer approaches of ACM and AG do
in fact expand the scope of reflection on the
management side of these systems to include a
larger multi-layered governance structure (Folke et
al. 2005, Folke 2007). However, they still build on
AM’s notion of systemic relationships to be
managed, but not to be shaped politically.
This implies a particular normative claim regarding
the purpose of governance: rather than politics—in
the sense of, for example, political actors with
values, interests, and ideas—it is the functional
imperative to maintain the resilience of social–
ecological systems investigated by AM experts that
is supposed to govern the world (Leach et al. 2007:
26–27). A claim that is, in fact, highly political
because not only does it favor a particular goal of
governance whose definition involves political
value questions (Nadasdy 2007) but also a particular
mode of managerial decision making, yet it
disregards others (e.g., majority rules).
Methodologically, AM adopts a science-like
approach to problem solving that involves the
design, testing, and reformulation of hypotheses as
elements of a more comprehensive cycle of learning
that includes practical experimentation, the
integration of different kinds of knowledge, as well
as a variety of modeling techniques. Newer
approaches embed this rather cognitive methodology
in social practices characterized by concepts such
as trust, vision, learning, collaboration, self-
organization, creativity, innovation, power sharing,
partnerships, etc. (Folke et al. 2005, Berkes 2007).
Altogether, these design features render AM an
effort at exploring the truth of resilience by the
systematic acquisition and integration of knowledge
through collaborative experimentation and learning.
Practical AM approaches, such as the one suggested
by Sendzimir et al. (2006), aim at overcoming the
“fundamental weaknesses of modern policy
processes” (Sendzimir et al. 2006: 143) by
excluding the political from working AM
arrangements. Political items such as interests,
opinions, and mandates are expected to be left
outside of the AM forum due to their potential to
provoke conflict, disturb cooperation, and thus
foster irrationality. It is assumed that this can be
achieved by selecting participants according to
particular criteria such as competence, respect, and
willingness to cooperate and by obliging them to
“leave [their] gun[s] at the door” (Sendzimir et al.
2006: 142).
With respect to the framework outlined above, the
AM design literature takes account of politics in a
rather selective manner. The polity dimension is
touched upon when organizational structures of AM
arrangements such as “bridging organizations” and
“shadow networks” are introduced. Likewise, basic
procedural principles such as trust-based
experimentation and collaborative learning are
prescribed (Folke et al. 2005, Hahn et al. 2006). But
aside from rather general references to the literature
of institution building (Dietz et al. 2003), there are
barely any further conceptual elaborations on
specific designs of polity on the micro level (e.g.,
rules, sanctions, incentives, etc.) that in fact enable
AM arrangements to function in accordance with
these principles. Instead, some authors conceptualize
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the emergence of AM arrangements in terms of a
process of spontaneous self-organization (see
Berkes 2007: 25). A similar picture can be drawn
with respect to the consideration of polity on the
meso and macro levels. Although some newer
contributions clearly acknowledge the embedding
of AM in a multi-layered institutional context, it is
not extensively reflected on how different
institutional layers may impact on the structure,
processes, and functions of an AM arrangement nor
on how to design interfaces between AM and
established forms of governance that enable the
entire structure to work in an effective and
legitimate way (Kallis et al. 2009).
Although there is some coverage of the polity
dimension, conceptual reflections with respect to
politics are scarce. Some authors, particularly those
contributing to newer ACM and AG approaches, do
mention the fundamental importance of political
conflict due to differences in power and values as
being inherent in environmental choices (Dietz et
al. 2003). However, the implications for
conceptualizing and designing AM are barely
elaborated on. Regarding the micro level, forms of
politics such as power struggles, tactics, and
conflicts within an AM arrangement do not seem to
play a considerable role. These “nasty politics” are
practically excluded (e.g., by the requirement to
leave guns at the door) or sidestepped by an
optimistic language that highlights the “smooth”
sides of knowledge production and learning.
References to power are either made by stressing
the (normative) feature of power sharing or in terms
of a disciplined form of management power that is
channeled through formal organizations and
procedures (Folke et al. 2005). Some authors do
acknowledge political conflict, but rather in the
sense of open dispute and “bound conflict” of
democratic competition that take a functional role
in policy-oriented learning, analogous to the
“invisible hand” of the market (Folke et al. 2005:
96). Furthermore, the AM literature does not
systematically consider the potential implications
of meso politics for the performance of AM
arrangements and vice versa: the embedding of the
members of an AM arena in overall actor
constellations structured by fundamentally different
interests and beliefs, not necessarily cooperative
action orientations, as well as strategies that can be
directed not only at collaborative problem solving,
but also at capturing or instrumentalizing AM
processes (cf. Kallis et al. 2009). The same is true
for politics on a macro level. Adaptive management
does not provide conceptual features for reflecting
on overall societal conflicts and power structures of
an incumbent political economy that, indeed, can
affect the processes and substantial range of
experimentation and learning within an AM
arrangement (Folke et al. 2005: 641) and, thus, is
reproduced and stabilized by AM (Nadasdy 2007).
Adaptive management concepts do refer extensively
to the policy dimension of the framework. Adaptive
management provides an elaborate understanding
of problems based on a specific theoretical view of
social–ecological systems as well as detailed
conceptual means of science-like problem solving
that emphasizes the significance of experimentation,
knowledge acquisition, and learning. However, the
reflection remains restricted to the micro level,
covering policy-oriented activities within confined
AM arrangements. Although governmental policies
are referred to as overall context variables and
enabling conditions for the emergence of AM (see
Olsson et al. 2004), the interplay of both meso
policies, such as existing regimes of land-use
planning and environmental policy, and macro
policies, such as overall policy ideas and paradigms,
with the AM arrangement is not systematically
considered.
In sum, AM prescribes a knowledge-oriented
strategy of collaborative learning by doing within a
governance arrangement that tends to remain
conceptually restricted to the micro level of policy.
Although some references are made to political
institutions and policies on other levels, there are
considerable reflective gaps first and foremost with
regard to the politics on all three levels. Thus, AM
appears as an approach that conceptually blocks out
the nasty and dark sides of the political that may
disturb rational problem solving. Neither are
theoretical arguments provided to support the idea
that AM arrangements do in fact work detached
from politics; nor does AM put forward convincing
design elements that can be assumed to actually
safeguard the exclusion of politics in practice. The
very effort of blocking out politics, however,
renders AM itself a highly political concept as it
tends to tacitly build on and reproduce given power
relations.
Transition Management
Inspired by historically reconstructive research on
sociotechnical transitions as well as the wide-
ranging interdisciplinary field of innovation studies,
complexity theory, and evolution theory (Geels
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2004, Elzen et al. 2004), TM represents a
governance approach for shaping innovation
processes and structural transitions within complex
sociotechnical systems such as energy provision,
mobility, and agriculture (Kemp et al. 2007a). There
are various concepts of TM in place. However, we
restrict our discussion to the concept of TM for
sustainable development. Since TM was introduced
by the Dutch government in the Fourth National
Environmental Policy Plan (VROM 2001), we can
observe a rapidly expanding practice and study of
TM primarily within the Netherlands (Loorbach
2007, Smith and Kern 2009), which, more recently,
are accompanied by critical accounts on the political
and democratic implications of the concept
(Hendriks and Grin 2007, Shove and Walker 2007,
2008, Rotmans and Kemp 2008, Hendriks 2009b,
Meadowcroft 2009, Scrase and Smith 2009, Voß et
al. 2009a).
 Assumptions, conceptualization, and operationalization
Transition management builds on the idea of
coevolutionary sociotechnical systems. Within
these systems, structural transitions are assumed to
evolve in a particular temporal pattern (as described
by the so-called “S-curve”) and in a multi-level
context: Emerging as innovations in sociotechnical
niches, they shift sociotechnical regimes and finally
affect the broader sociotechnical landscape
(Rotmans et al. 2001). Drawing on these theoretical
assumptions about transitions, TM as a management
concept is considered a deliberate approach to
putting hands on the systems’ inherent dynamics:
to “influence the direction and speed of transitions
by coordinating and enabling the processes that
occur at different levels in a more systemic and
evolutionary way” (Kemp and Loorbach 2006:
109). It aims at facilitating a more fundamental and
long-term reflection on sociotechnical system
dynamics in order to overcome the myopic
orientation of established policy-making processes
(Rotmans et al. 2007). However, TM is claimed to
be fundamentally different from traditional political
planning. Referring to the concept of “incremental
politics,” Kemp and Loorbach (2006: 109) define
TM as an “attempt at goal-oriented modulation, not
an attempt to achieve predefined outcomes through
planning and control.” Rotmans et al. (2007) situate
TM more precisely in the middle ground between
planning and incrementalism. Asserting that it
combines the best of both worlds, they characterize
TM as a “perspective incrementalism for
sustainable development” (Rotmans et al. 2007: 25).
Overall, TM rests on a “softened rationality” that
rejects the possibility of accurately steering
sociotechnical systems from A to B, but assumes a
chance to modulate A in the direction of B.
As a “flexible and evolutionary approach, which
will never become a blueprint” (Rotmans et al. 2007:
5), TM provides general principles such as systems
thinking, long-term thinking, back-casting, and
forecasting, a focus on learning by doing, an
orientation toward system innovation and
experimentation as well as participation that serve
as starting points for practitioners and researchers
to curtail problem-specific governance strategies
(Kemp et al. 2007a, Rotmans et al. 2001). These
principles come into play in a particular operational
governance design that combines an institutional
arrangement (transition arena) with various
systemic transition instruments in a cyclical four-
step transition management process (Kemp and
Loorbach 2006, Kemp et al. 2007a).
The first step refers to the creation of the transition
arena, the institutional core of an emerging
transition project. Its purpose is to facilitate
interaction and learning, as well as set up a transition
agenda in a network of relevant innovators and
strategic thinkers from different backgrounds. The
arena’s participants—open-minded “visionaries”
or “forerunners”, who are “able to look beyond their
own domain of working”—are selected according
to the “transition problem at hand” and with respect
to their competences (Kemp and Loorbach 2006:
112).
The second step is about “developing sustainability
visions and transition agendas” within this arena.
First, the arena’s members are supposed to develop
commonly shared perceptions of the transition
problem(s) in a mode of multi-perspective and
collective problem definition through which the
participants will be informed by each other’s
perspectives and adjust their definitions of the
problem accordingly (Kemp and Loorbach 2006:
113). Then, goals on two levels of abstraction are
developed: although the “innovative and imaginative”
transition vision serves as an overall long-term
orientation, more specific transition images
represent integral thematic targets that evolve over
time according to collected “insights and learning
effects” (Kemp and Loorbach 2006). Finally,
transition pathways are set up to translate these
strategic goals into operational means, taking into
consideration expected developments such as trend
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breaks, behavioral and institutional changes, the
uncertainties associated with the pathway as well as
prospects for and barriers to implementation (Kemp
and Loorbach 2006: 114). Ideally, some transition
paths are pre-tested and explored in small-scale
experiments that serve as further input for the
overall transition program.
The third step of the TM cycle refers to “mobilizing
actors and executing projects and experiments”
through applicable transition programs that foster
the “real use of new technologies in society” in order
to learn from practice and facilitate processes of
mutual adaptation (Kemp and Loorbach 2006: 115).
To prevent backlashes, the transition project needs
to create public support for the transition goals and
related experiments. For this reason, the transition
arena is supposed to constantly expand to less
strategically oriented actors (such as local
authorities) as well as the wider public.
According to the fourth step, the entire transition
project is to be continuously evaluated and
monitored by so-called “development rounds” that
balance the achievement of interim objectives and
assess the quality of the TM process. This constant
evaluation is expected to induce learning processes,
further the exploration of how sociotechnical
systems function, and trigger the evolutionary
selection of transition goals and pathways (Kemp
and Loorbach 2006: 115).
 Transition management and politics
Recent critical accounts have revealed a
problematic relationship between TM and politics:
a lack of conceptual awareness about the embedding
of TM designs in political contexts on the one hand
and an implicit normativity regarding the political
on the other hand (Hendriks and Grin 2007, Shove
and Walker 2007, Meadowcroft 2009). Notions
such as the political process, political margins, the
public, and political negotiations suggest that
politics play a more distinct role in the TM literature
than in AM. This is underscored by the
consideration of TM as an effort to complement and
transform policy making (Rotmans et al. 2001) and
to work as a kind of a meta policy that integrates
sectoral policies (Kemp et al. 2007a). Yet, TM’s
conceptual repertoire for reflecting on politics
appears unspecified. Conceiving of the political
process as a means by which society decides upon
the overall transition goals (Kemp and Loorbach
2006: 109) implies that politics affect, and should
affect, the transition project. But the political
process appears to be restricted to the definition of
goals, suggesting that all other steps of the TM cycle
are (and should be?) disconnected from politics.
Furthermore, it is unclear how exactly, and through
which mechanisms, the political process is linked
to the transition arena and how it relates to the goal-
setting activities that take place within the arena
(Meadowcroft 2009).
Kemp and Loorbach (2006: 109, Fig. 5.3) explicitly
mention the existence of “political margins,”
implying that TM takes place in a broader political
context. But neither the properties of these margins
are elaborated nor is it specified where and how they
actually play out. These political margins could be
interpreted as being related to the public. However,
the rather instrumental consideration of the “wider
public” as a critical supportive factor for
maintaining the TM process (Kemp and Loorbach
2006: 116) neglects the public’s general interplay
with the overall transition project. Other possible
interpretations of political margins, such as trend
breaks, behavioral and institutional changes, as well
as barriers to and chances for implementation
(Kemp and Loorbach 2006: 114), are presented as
potential disruptions and triggers for particular
substantial transition pathways only, without
elaborating on how they may exert influence on the
workings of the transition arena itself.
Occasionally, the TM literature points to the
empirical significance of political negotiations
dominated by power, interests, and conflicts within
the transition arena that influence substantial efforts
to shape sociotechnical change (Kemp and
Loorbach 2006). There is also a clear awareness of
the ambivalent and contested character of
sustainability transitions (Kemp et al. 2007a).
However, these concerns get lost when it comes to
the articulation of governance designs where
negotiations appear as merely cooperative and
rational, yielding a common understanding and
shared ideas, but no longer involving interest- and
power-related strategic activities (cf. Meadowcroft
2009). Within the transition arena, “nasty politics”
seem to vanish, power issues are channeled, and
conflicts transformed into harmonious agreement.
How can this understanding of politics be
characterized with respect to the framework
sketched out above? Transition management
provides overall design principles as well as
concrete instruments for defining problems,
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creating visions, and setting up transition pathways.
As such, it entails a differentiated conceptual
repertoire for guiding policy-oriented reflections
and actions with regard to the substantial
modulation of sociotechnical transitions. Regarding
polity, the approach considers the transition arena
as the institutional core of a transition project. It also
prescribes some functional features of this arena,
such as the arena as a place for mutual learning.
However, TM does not offer more specific ideas
about which concrete institutional design elements
might create the conditions for a transition arena to
actually fulfill the functional expectations. This
becomes particularly clear when it comes to politics.
Although the possibility of political power struggles
and conflicts, as well as the danger of transition
projects being captured by partial interests are
mentioned, there is hardly any reflection on how
these forms of politics might affect the performance
of a transition arena, on what institutional grounds
they can be handled so that learning and
experimentation within the transition arena can take
place, or how they can be strategically used for
facilitating social–technical change (cf. Berkhout et
al. 2004).
With respect to the levels of political context, TM’s
conceptual focal point is on the micro level: on a
confined transition arena that is expected to provide
a protected breeding ground for new ideas and
policy options. Certainly the transition arena is
meant to span various levels and sectors of
governance (Kemp et al. 2007a), and institutional
changes are referred to as potential impact factors
for substantial transition pathways (Kemp and
Loorbach 2006). However, TM’s conceptual
apparatus barely addresses the implications of the
meso and macro levels of polity and politics, such
as overall constitutional structures or societal power
relations for the working of and the performance of
a transition arena itself. Likewise, the TM literature
does explicitly consider links to a broader policy
regime (meso policy) as TM is conceived as an effort
to reach out to and transform, through the members
of the transition network, innovation-related policy
processes (Kemp et al. 2007b). Conversely, it does
not take into account potential implications of
incumbent policy regimes and the overall policy
landscape for policy making within the transition
arena.
In sum, TM highlights the policy dimension at a
micro level, but does not systematically reflect on
its interplay with other dimensions and levels of
politics. Although TM clearly acknowledges that
there is a world of politics, the relationship to this
political context appears to be ambivalent. On the
one hand, politics is assumed to be functionally
significant for TM in various respects: by
accounting for the definition of overall transition
goals (political process), by restricting sociotechnical
transitions (political margins), by serving as a
supporting factor (public), and by imposing conflict
(political negotiations). Moreover, TM’s entire
strategy is political as it is about establishing shadow
arenas that are supposed to exert a transformative
power on existing policy regimes. On the other
hand, it seems that politics are excluded from the
management of transitions by a conceptualization
that places large parts of the political outside the
realm of the transition arena, and by the promotion
of an understanding of collaboration, experimentation,
and learning that seems to ignore “nasty politics.”
Again, there is a conceptual gap in reflecting
implications of TM as part of a political world that
is not only affected by, but also affects TM. It
remains unclear whether and on what grounds
politics should and could actually be kept “outside”
the transition arena and “switched off” while
transition projects are set up and carried out.
Comparative View of the Two Approaches
The preceding discussion of AM and TM reveals
various similarities. Similarities have also been
noted by other authors searching for possibilities for
cross-pollination (van der Brugge and van Raak
2007, Foxon et al. 2009) or a transfer of lessons
(Smith and Stirling 2010). The latter, especially,
highlight aspects of politics and how they can be
integrated with a basic ontology of complex systems
and their evolutionary dynamics that underlies both
approaches. Both approaches suggest governance
designs that take into account the limits to
predictability and control due to the uncertainty and
dynamics of complex systems. Addressing these
challenges, they promote an experimental
orientation, a learning-by-doing approach, as well
as the participation and collaboration of diverse
actors in order to integrate different perspectives
and resources for governing. Table 2 provides a
comparative overview of the two approaches.
Building on our analytical framework, we argue that
AM and TM are also similar regarding their
understanding of and reference to politics. The
conceptual focus lies on policy at the micro level
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Table 2. Comparison of adaptive management and transition management
Adaptive Management Transition Management
Theoretical
background
Resource management, ecology, resilience
theory, “panarchy” theory
Technology and innovation studies, complexity theory,
evolutionary theory
Realm of
application
Socioecological systems (SES): functionally or
spatially defined systems (natural parks, river
basins, etc.)
Sociotechnical systems (STS): arrangements providing
societal functions such as energy provision, agriculture,
transportation
Overall
objective
Adaptation
Maintain resilience of socioecological systems
by increasing capacity to cope with complex
dynamics
Change
Transform existing sociotechnical systems by modulating
ongoing innovation, leading to a sustainability transition
Basic
assumptions
Complex and coevolving systems
Constant cyclic change is taking place
Universal cycle of collapse and renewal
Complex and coevolving systems
Transitions are taking place
S-Curve as universal pattern of change
Concept of
governing
Experimentation and learning
Navigate through cycles of social–ecological
change
Bring heterogeneous actors together to
construct and test policy hypotheses
Experimentation and learning
Modulate sociotechnical dynamics (breed alternative
systems)
Provide platform for frontrunners to collectively
experiment and learn what works
Consideration
of politics
Substitute politics by trust-based collaborative
learning in interaction with social–ecological
system, but no design elements for how to
achieve this
No systematic consideration of political
contexts
Draw on institutionalized policy process for general
goals, but avoid interference. Negotiations in transition
arena without power and strategic interaction. Public
opinion as external factor
Add-on to “normal” policy making
(see Fig. 2). Micro politics, such as power struggles
and tactical games by which actors try to impose
their interests and views, gain dominance over
resources and move into positions of authority
within the respective arenas of experimentation and
learning, however, they don’t seem to play a role;
neither do relations with actor constellations and
power struggles in established domains of
environmental policy, energy, construction, and
transport to which AM and TM seek to contribute
(meso politics); nor broader patterns of power and
conflict within the particular political systems
within which they are to work (macro politics).
Although there are individual references in both
literatures to broader policy and polity contexts,
nowhere is there a systematic consideration of how
the problem-solving approach of collaborative
experimentation and learning could interfere with
policy paradigms and institutional arrangements of
established policy domains or with discourses on
basic political beliefs and values or with
constitutional frameworks of the political systems
within which AM or TM are to be embedded (and
that are often based on principles of representative
democracy).
From the perspective of reflexive governance, AM
and TM are indeed reflexive, as they place
themselves within complex social–ecological and
social–technical systems and acknowledge the
limits of linear planning and control due to the
inherent complexities and uncertainties of these
systems. However, they do not consider the political
conditions of governance. This is evident in the
absence of detailed institutional provisions to
actually safeguard reflexive governance designs
from being dominated and captured by powerful
political actors, as well as in a lack of distinct
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Fig. 2. Restricted view of politics in reflexive governance designs.
methods for reflecting on and dealing with “nasty
politics” that may play out in envisioned processes
of experimentation and learning.
In effect, AM and TM assume a space that is
shielded against the influence of politics as we know
it. They do not provide theoretical arguments for
this assumption, however, or specific design
elements that could be expected to constitute the
conditions under which experimentation and
collective learning can, in fact, operate
independently of politics. Such a “depoliticized”
view of governance may serve to attract policy
makers as it suggests neutrality and carries a
promise of problem-solving coalitions across
established lines of political conflict (Smith and
Kern 2009). However, it may be considered
problematic for various reasons. Designs for social
learning that do not adequately take into account
conflict, power, and tactics are prone to domination
and strategic instrumentalization by a powerful few
who seek to further their own interests and positions
rather than engaging in mutual learning for a
sustainable society. Designs that do not consider
their embedding in political contexts risk
encountering a “problem of fit” with pre-existing
patterns of politics and run the risk of being distorted
as they are introduced for implementation. Finally,
talking governance while veiling politics makes
way for the rise of obscure and uncurbed forms of
political power that lack legitimacy.
INTEGRATING POLITICS IN THE DESIGN
OF REFLEXIVE GOVERNANCE
How can limitations in current conceptions of
reflexive governance be overcome? Building on the
analysis of governance designs for AM and TM in
the preceding sections, we now turn to pathways for
further developing those designs. This is also
relevant for integrating politics in the discourse on
reflexive governance more generally. Starting from
a diagnosed focus of AM and TM on the policy
dimension and at the micro level of politics, we
discuss two directions for further research and
development. These can be depicted as a horizontal
and a vertical movement within the framework
introduced above (see Fig. 3). The horizontal
movement refers to the conceptual inclusion of
conflict and power struggle within arrangements of
collective learning (micro politics) and to the
development of specific institutional settings that
are required to make sure that asymmetries of power
and attempts at dominating and instrumentalizing
the learning process for particular interests are
counterbalanced (micro polity). The vertical
movement refers to a perspective on governance
design that systematically considers interactions
with existing patterns of governance on a level of
policy domains and political systems.
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Fig. 3. Routes for integrating politics in reflexive governance designs.
Considering the Politics of Learning, Building
Safeguards against Domination and Capture
Both AM and TM build on an idealized image of
cognitive learning that assumes unbiased observers
of systemic changes, open-minded consideration of
developmental options, and unequivocal interpretations
of results from experimentation. Such a view
neglects that experimental learning for sustainable
development does not take place inside a scientific
laboratory, somehow detached from immediate
stakes and interests of actors, but in the real world
where it is directly linked with ongoing processes
of societal change (Groß et al. 2005, Rip 2006,
Callon 2009). In a more or less direct way,
experimenters with social–ecological or sociotechnical
systems are themselves part of the experimental set
up. Consequently, the framing, observation, and
interpretation of sustainability experiments are
highly reflexive exercises that affect identities,
positions, and opportunities of individual actors.
Whatever is being “learned” about sustainable
development options in such arrangements has
immediate implications for the possibility to
continue certain lifestyles and business strategies or
maintain positions of power, and thus entails high
political stakes (Böschen and Weis 2007:169–171,
Shove and Walker 2007: 766). Objectivistic models
of scientific discovery (AM) or evolutionary
selection (TM) appear problematic as they overlook
the possibilities of strategic actors to shape or even
to manipulate the set up and evaluation of
experiments against the background of their own
beliefs and interests (Meadowcroft 2009).
The literature on policy analysis and evaluation
(Braybrooke and Lindblom 1963, Stone 1988, Guba
and Lincoln 1989, Lindblom 1990, Fischer and
Forester 1993), environmental policy making
(Hajer 1995, Hisschemöller et al. 2001), and
technology and risk assessment (Wynne 1975,
1995, Stirling 2003, 2006) provides ample evidence
of how knowledge production and politics
intertwine. For sustainable development, these
issues intensify with the complexity of debated
phenomena and the focus on transformative changes
(Thompson 1997, Funtowicz et al. 1998, Voß et al.
2007).
Further development of designs for reflexive
governance thus needs to take into account the
politics of learning. A key task is to provide for
safeguards against domination and instrumentalization
by powerful groups. In the context of the framework
set out above, this comes down to the integration of
strategic interactions among conflicting societal
perspectives (micro politics) and institutional
provisions to calibrate and make political
interactions productive (micro polity). Reflecting
on adequate ways to work with conflict and power
in the process of experimentation and learning is a
necessary complement for coping with ambivalence,
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EURDGHUSROLWLFDOFRQWH[WVPD\DIIHFW WKHZRUNLQJ
RU WKH DFFHSWDELOLW\ RI SURSRVHG GHVLJQV RU KRZ
GHVLJQV PLJKW JHW GLVWRUWHG LQ WKH SURFHVV RI
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ DV WKH\ PHHW ZLWK LQFXPEHQW
SROLWLFDOIRUFHV$GDSWLYHPDQDJHPHQWDQG70DUH
UDWKHU VWUDLJKWIRUZDUGO\ SUHVHQWHG IRU XQLYHUVDO
DSSOLFDWLRQ HYHQ LI DGYRFDWHV FRQFHGH WKDW VRPH
DGDSWDWLRQ IRU VSHFLILF FRQWH[WV PD\ EH QHHGHG
.HPS DQG /RRUEDFK   0HDGRZFURIW
FKDUDFWHUL]HV70DV³KRSHOHVVO\XQUHDOLVWLF´DVLW
LPSOLHV ³VXEVWDQWLDO SROLF\ VWDELOLW\ DQG UHVLOLHQW
SROLWLFDO FRDOLWLRQV WR NHHS UHIRUP IURP EHLQJ
GHUDLOHG E\ FKDQJHV LQ SROLWLFDO SHUVRQQHO DQG D
WXUEXOHQWFRQMXQFWXUH´0HDGRZFURIW
.HPSHWDODDGPLWWKDW70LV³GRDEOH
LQDVRFLHW\ LQZKLFKLQWHUHVWVDUHZHOORUJDQL]HG
DQGVWHHULQJIURPWKHWRSLVEDVLFDOO\LPSRVVLEOH´
+HLVNDQHQ HW DO  GLVFXVV VXEVWDQWLDO
WUDQVODWLRQV ZKHQ WUDQVIHUUHG WR RWKHU SROLWLFDO
FRQWH[WV$SSDUHQWSUREOHPVZLWKLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ
DUH IUDPHG DV ³WHHWKLQJ SUREOHPV´ FI /RRUEDFK
±QRWDVDQRFFDVLRQWRTXHVWLRQWKH
ILWRIQHZGHVLJQVZLWKHVWDEOLVKHGSDWWHUQVRISROLF\
PDNLQJRQWKLVSRLQWVHH6PLWKDQG.HUQ
DQGFRQWULEXWLRQVLQ9RHWDOE
$ EULHI ORRN DW WKH OLWHUDWXUH RI UHOHYDQW SROLF\
VWXGLHVSURYLGHVDPSOHHYLGHQFHRIHVWDEOLVKHGDFWRU
FRQVWHOODWLRQV DQG FRQIOLFW SDWWHUQV SROLF\
SDUDGLJPV DQG SROLWLFDO LQVWLWXWLRQV FRQGLWLRQLQJ
WKHXSWDNHDQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRISROLF\GHVLJQV
ERWKDWWKHOHYHORISDUWLFXODUSROLF\GRPDLQVDQG
SROLWLFDOV\VWHPVDWODUJHHJ+DOO3LHUVRQ
6DEDWLHUDQG-HQNLQV6PLWK(GPRQGVRQ
2OVHQ%DXPJDUWQHUDQG-RQHV
)RU JRYHUQDQFH GHVLJQV WKDW DUH EDVHG RQ
H[SHULPHQWDWLRQDQGOHDUQLQJLWPD\EHRIVSHFLDO
UHOHYDQFH WKDW EURDGHU SROLWLFDO FRQWH[WV DUH DOVR
OLQNHG WR VSHFLILF HSLVWHPRORJLFDO FXOWXUHV WKDW
GHILQH WKH NLQG RI NQRZOHGJH DQG SURFHGXUHV RI
NQRZOHGJHSURGXFWLRQWKDWDUHDFFHSWHGWRSURYLGH
DUHOHYDQWDQGYDOLGEDVLVIRUSROLF\PDNLQJ+RSSH
DQG 3HWHUVHQ  +RSSH  -DVDQRII 
5\IH  +HQGULNV DQG *ULQ  $QRWKHU
VSHFLILF FKDOOHQJH UHODWHV WR LQWHUIHUHQFH ZLWK
HVWDEOLVKHGSROLF\GLVFRXUVHVDQGSUDFWLFHV .HUQ
DQG +RZOHWW  6PLWK DQG .HUQ :LWK
UHJDUGWRREYLRXVGLVFUHSDQFLHVEHWZHHQ$0¶VDQG
70¶V FRQFHSW RI JUDQWLQJ SRZHUV RI GHILQLQJ
VXVWDLQDEOH GHYHORSPHQW WR D QRQUHSUHVHQWDWLYH
FLUFOHRISDUWLFLSDQWVZLWKHVWDEOLVKHGLQVWLWXWLRQVRI
UHSUHVHQWDWLYH GHPRFUDF\ VRPH FULWLFV KDYH
DFFXVHGDGYRFDWHVRIWKHVHGHVLJQVRIIROORZLQJD
YLVLRQRIHQOLJKWHQHGWHFKQRFUDWLFOHDGHUVKLSZKLOH
GHOLEHUDWHO\LJQRULQJWKHFRQGLWLRQVRIGHPRFUDWLF
SROLWLFV 6KRYH DQG:DONHU $YHOLQR 
+HQGULNV D $JDLQVW WKLV EDFNJURXQG LW
DSSHDUVWKDWUREXVWGHVLJQVWUDWHJLHVUHTXLUHFDUHIXO
DQDO\VLV RI ODUJHU SROLWLFDO V\VWHP FRQWH[WV DQG
G\QDPLFV LQ RUGHU WR DQWLFLSDWH LQWHUDFWLRQVZLWK
UHIOH[LYHJRYHUQDQFHDUUDQJHPHQWV
)RU DQDO\]LQJ DQG DQWLFLSDWLQJ SROLWLFDO FRQWH[W
G\QDPLFVZHFDQILQGVRPHLQVSLUDWLRQLQ$0DQG
70WKHPVHOYHVLIZHWUDQVODWHPHWKRGVRIV\VWHP
DQDO\VLVIURPVRFLDO±HFRORJLFDODQGVRFLRWHFKQLFDO
V\VWHPVWRSROLWLFDOV\VWHPV6RPHWHQWDWLYHLGHDV
DUHSUHVHQWHGDVVWDUWLQJSRLQWVIRUIXUWKHUUHVHDUFK
DQGGLVFXVVLRQ

● $ ILUVW DSSURDFK FRXOG EH WR XQGHUWDNH D
V\VWHPDWLFPDSSLQJRISROLWLFDOFRQWH[WVDQG
WKHLURQJRLQJG\QDPLFVRQYDULRXVGLIIHUHQW
OHYHOVLQRUGHUWRDVVHVVWKHSROLWLFDOILWRIQHZ
JRYHUQDQFH GHVLJQV 6XFK PDSSLQJ FRXOG
EXLOG RQ RXU IUDPHZRUN WR V\VWHPDWLFDOO\
DFFRXQW IRU GLPHQVLRQV RI SROLF\ SROLWLFV
DQG SROLW\ DQG FRQWH[WXDO SDWWHUQV DW WKH
PLFURPHVRDQGPDFUROHYHOV)RUGHYLVLQJ
GHVLJQVWUDWHJLHVWKDWLQFRUSRUDWHLQWHUDFWLRQV
ZLWKSROLWLFDOFRQWH[WVLWZRXOGEHDGYLVDEOH
WR QRW RQO\ GR D VWDWLF PDSSLQJ EXW DOVR
XQGHUWDNHDQDQDO\VLVRIRQJRLQJG\QDPLFV
RI FKDQJH LQ RUGHU WR EH DEOH WR DQWLFLSDWH
WKURXJK GLIIHUHQW VFHQDULRV RSSRUWXQLWLHV
DQGWKUHDWVWKDWDUHOLNHO\WRDULVHLQWKHIXWXUH

(FRORJ\DQG6RFLHW\
KWWSZZZHFRORJ\DQGVRFLHW\RUJYROLVVDUW
● $VHFRQGDSSURDFKZKLFKSDUWO\EXLOGVRQ
WKHILUVWRQHFRXOGEHDVWUDWHJLFDGDSWDWLRQ
RIUHIOH[LYHJRYHUQDQFHGHVLJQVWRFUHDWHILW
ZLWK FXUUHQW RU XSFRPLQJ RSHQLQJV LQ WKH
SROLWLFDO FRQWH[W $Q REYLRXV FKDOOHQJH
ZRXOGEHWRILQGDZD\WRPRGLI\GHVLJQVIRU
UHIOH[LYH JRYHUQDQFH DV GHULYHG IURP WKH
DQDO\VLV RI FRPSOH[ G\QDPLFV RI VRFLDO
WHFKQRORJLFDO DQG HFRORJLFDO V\VWHPV
ZLWKRXWORVLQJWKHLUSDUWLFXODUTXDOLWLHVVXFK
DV WKH DFNQRZOHGJPHQW RI LUUHVROYDEOH
DPELYDOHQFHVIXQGDPHQWDOXQFHUWDLQW\DQG
GLVWULEXWHG SRZHU LQ VKDSLQJ VXVWDLQDEOH
GHYHORSPHQW $GDSWDWLRQ WR SROLWLFDO
FRQWH[WV DW WKH FRVW RI ORVLQJ LPSRUWDQW
UHIOH[LYH TXDOLWLHV ZRXOG EH DV XVHOHVV DV
LQVLVWLQJ RQ IDQF\ FRQFHSWV RI RSHQHQGHG
OHDUQLQJZKLFK SURYH LQFDSDEOH RI OLQNLQJ
ZLWKH[LVWLQJSROLWLFDOSUDFWLFHVLQDQ\JLYHQ
FRQWH[WRIDSSOLFDWLRQ

● )LQDOO\DVDWKLUGDSSURDFKRQHFDQWKLQNRI
DFWLYHO\ HQJDJLQJ ZLWK SROLWLFDO FRQWH[W
G\QDPLFV ZLWK D YLHZ WR LQIOXHQFLQJ DQG
VKDSLQJ WKHP $V GHVLJQV IRU UHIOH[LYH
JRYHUQDQFH PD\ LPSO\ SUDFWLFHV WKDW DUH
UDGLFDOO\ QHZ DQG GLIIHUHQW FRPSDUHGZLWK
HVWDEOLVKHG SROLWLFDO SUDFWLFHV LQ DQ\
SDUWLFXODUFRQWH[WEURDGHUSROLWLFDOFKDQJHV
PD\ LQGHHG EH D SUHFRQGLWLRQ IRU WKH
LQWURGXFWLRQRIUHIOH[LYHJRYHUQDQFH%DVHG
RQWKHPDSSLQJRIRQJRLQJSROLWLFDOG\QDPLFV
DVSURSRVHG DERYH VXFK DWWHPSWV FRXOGEH
IRFXVHGRQ WKH DGYDQFHPHQW RU FUHDWLRQRI
ORFDORSHQLQJVZLWKLQHVWDEOLVKHGSDWWHUQVRI
JRYHUQDQFH7KH\FRXOGEHSURYLGHGE\QHZ
LVVXHV WKDW IDOO LQ EHWZHHQ HVWDEOLVKHG
SUREOHPVROYLQJGLVFRXUVHVDQG LQVWLWXWLRQV
RU E\ VSHFLILF FXOWXUDO DQG LQVWLWXWLRQDO
FRQGLWLRQV ZLWKLQ WKH FRQILQHG VHWWLQJ RI
FHUWDLQ PXQLFLSDOLWLHV RU SROLF\ GRPDLQV
6XFK RSHQLQJV FRXOG SURYLGH QLFKHV IRU
SURELQJ QHZ JRYHUQDQFH GHVLJQV DQG
EUHHGLQJ DOWHUQDWLYH SROLWLFDO SUDFWLFHV ,I
H[SHULHQFH ZLWK UHIOH[LYH JRYHUQDQFH
DFFXPXODWHV DQG QHZ GHVLJQV JDLQ DQ
LQVWLWXWLRQDOPRPHQWXPRI WKHLURZQ ORFDO
RSHQLQJV PD\ EHFRPH VWUHWFKHG DQG
ZLGHQHGDQGUHIOH[LYHJRYHUQDQFHSUDFWLFHV
PD\VWDUWWRLQWHUDFWZLWKDQGVKDSHEURDGHU
SROLWLFDOFRQWH[WGHYHORSPHQWV

 ,Q FRQFOXGLQJ WKLV EULHI RXWORRN RQ SRVVLEOH
RULHQWDWLRQV IRU GHYHORSLQJ GHVLJQ VWUDWHJLHV IRU
UHIOH[LYHJRYHUQDQFHZHVXJJHVWFRQFHLYLQJRIWKH
FKDOOHQJH RI FUHDWLQJ QHZ IRUPV RI UHIOH[LYH
JRYHUQDQFHDVDQLQQRYDWLRQSURFHVV9RD
E 9R HW DO D ,W PD\ KHOS LQ ILQGLQJ
DSSURSULDWH VWUDWHJLHV LI WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI QHZ
IRUPVRIJRYHUQDQFH LV LQ LWVHOI VHHQDVDQRSHQ
HQGHG VHDUFK SURFHVV D FKDOOHQJH RI QDYLJDWLQJ
FRPSOH[G\QDPLFFRQWH[WVDQGRIFRSLQJZLWKDODFN
RISUHGLFWDELOLW\DQGFRQWURO5DWKHUWKDQGHYLVLQJ
VRSKLVWLFDWHG OHDUQLQJ PRGHOV WKDW FRUUHVSRQG WR
VRPH DEVWUDFW WKHRU\ RI VRFLDO±HFRORJLFDO RU
VRFLRWHFKQLFDOFKDQJHDQLQQRYDWLRQSHUVSHFWLYHRQ
UHIOH[LYH JRYHUQDQFH ZRXOG EH FRQFHUQHG ZLWK
DFWXDO SROLWLFDO SUDFWLFHV DQG DOORZDQFHV DQG
FRQVWUDLQWVRIH[LVWLQJSDWWHUQVRIJRYHUQLQJ²DQG
WKHLU G\QDPLFV 7KH GHYHORSPHQW RI UHIOH[LYH
JRYHUQDQFHGHVLJQVZRXOGEHDPDWWHURISURELQJ
DQG UHGHVLJQLQJEDVHGRQ D FULWLFDO HYDOXDWLRQRI
H[SHULHQFHV²DQ RQJRLQJ SURFHVV VKDSHG E\
GLVWULEXWHG DFWLYLWLHV RI PDQ\ LQYROYHG DFWRUV
SURSRQHQWVDVZHOODVFULWLFV
&21&/86,216
:HVHWRXWWRUHIOHFWRQ$0DQG70WZRSDUWLFXODU
GHVLJQV RI UHIOH[LYH JRYHUQDQFH IURP D EURDGHU
SHUVSHFWLYHRQSROLWLFV ,QRUGHU WR LGHQWLI\EOLQG
VSRWVLQFXUUHQWGLVFRXUVHVRQUHIOH[LYHJRYHUQDQFH
DQG WRZRUNRXWVWUDWHJLHV WRRYHUFRPHWKHPZH
KDYH LQWURGXFHG D IUDPHZRUN WKDW GLVWLQJXLVKHV
GLIIHUHQW GLPHQVLRQV SROLW\ SROLF\ DQGSROLWLFV
DQG OHYHOV RI SROLWLFV PLFURPHVRPDFUR2XU
DQDO\VLVVKRZVWKDW$0DQG70EXLOGRQDUHVWULFWHG
FRQFHSWXDO YLHZ RI SROLWLFV 7KH\ DUH PDLQO\
FRQFHUQHGZLWKWKHDUWLFXODWLRQRIDVWUDWHJ\WRFRSH
ZLWKSUREOHPVRIVRFLDO±HFRORJLFDODQGVRFLRWHFKQLFDO
FRPSOH[LW\ QDPHO\ D VWUDWHJ\ RI FROODERUDWLYH
H[SHULPHQWDWLRQ DQG OHDUQLQJ $JDLQVW WKH
EDFNJURXQG RI RXU IUDPHZRUN ERWK GHVLJQV
SULPDULO\GHDOZLWKWKHSROLF\GLPHQVLRQRQDPLFUR
OHYHO 7KLV OHDGV WR DQ LGHDOLVWLF FRQFHSW RI
H[SHULPHQWDWLRQDQGOHDUQLQJDVGULYHQE\DMRLQW
SUREOHPVROYLQJLQWHUHVWRISDUWLFLSDWLQJDFWRUVDV
ZHOODVDGLVUHJDUGIRU³QDVW\SROLWLFV´DQGGHWDLOHG
SURFHGXUDOSURYLVLRQVWKDWFDQZRUNDVVDIHJXDUGV
DJDLQVW GRPLQDWLRQ DQG FDSWXUH RI OHDUQLQJ
SURFHVVHVE\SRZHUIXODFWRUV$IXUWKHUOLPLWDWLRQ
LV WKH QHJOHFW RI LQWHUDFWLRQV ZLWK WKH EURDGHU
SROLWLFDOFRQWH[WLQZKLFKQHZGHVLJQVDUHVXSSRVHG
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to work. As alluded to in recent critical debates
about both AM and TM, these shortcomings have
the potential to severely reduce the viability of
reflexive governance designs—in conceptual,
practical, and normative regards.
This has led us to sketch two avenues of further
research along which concepts and designs for
reflexive governance could be revised with a view
to integrating a broader view of political impacts on
envisaged governance processes: a “horizontal”
widening on the micro level of envisaged learning
arrangements where the consideration of “nasty
politics” requires safeguards against capture and
instrumentalization. And a “vertical” widening to
include the meso and macro levels of the political
context as a starting point for the development of
innovation strategies for new forms of governance.
Politics cannot be escaped or bypassed, nor
eliminated or completely controlled by governance
designs, but they can be analyzed and reflected on
in order to devise more robust design strategies for
new reflexive forms of governance. This is what we
hope to encourage and support with the provision
of this framework and sketching of avenues for
further research.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol16/iss2/art9/responses/
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